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Abstract In this paper it is argued that subjective well-being (SWB) of the individual
depends on two types of variables. The first type consists of characteristics of the
individual himself, such as age, health, income, etc. The second type of variables
consists of the characteristics of the individuals belonging to his reference group. The
vast literature about happiness, quality of life, and well-being informs us extensively
about the effects of objective variables. How the second type affects well-being
is much less investigated. It is argued that the concept of well-being inequality
cannot be properly defined without taking the referencing process into account.
The reference effect depends on how frequently individuals compare with others
and on the degree of social transparency in society. We attempt to give a structural
embedding of the idea of reference groups in SWB-models. In this paper we employ
the reference-extended model for incorporating in happiness studies the concept of
inequality in happiness or SWB. Finally, we plead for an extension of the present
happiness paradigm by setting up a new additional agenda for empirical research in
order to get quantified knowledge about the referencing process. As a first step we
suggest a new question module to be included in new survey questionnaires.
Keywords Subjective well being · Happiness · Inequality · Reference group
1 Introduction
In the body of traditional economics the role of the utility concept has been am-
biguous. On the one hand it is central in micro-economic model building to explain
human choice behavior. On the other hand it is shunned, since it appears very hard
to give it an empirical content. With respect to the explanation of choice behavior
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this could be overcome by introducing the concept of ordinal utility. However, if
we are interested in inequality, the concept of ordinal utility becomes useless, for
the cornerstone of the inequality concept is the assumption that the situation of
individuals can be compared, not only in terms of better and worse, but also in terms
of how much better or worse. If we want to compare individual well-being between
individuals, it requires a cardinal well-being1 concept.
Notwithstanding this, the inequality concept has already a long history in eco-
nomics. Things started with measuring income inequalities. These were statistical pa-
rameters that described the distribution of observed incomes. Well-known examples
are the Pareto α, the standard deviation of log-incomes or Theil’s entropy measure.
In terms of such measures perfect equality corresponds with a value zero.
Atkinson [1] was one of the first who devised an inequality measure that was more
than a statistical measure. Although he never stated this explicitly, he proposed in
fact that the relevant measure to gauge social inequality is not the inequality of in-
comes but the inequality of individual well-being. This inequality measure was based
on a social welfare function (SWF) where minimum inequality corresponds with
the situation where the social welfare function is maximized and due to concavity
everybody enjoys an equal amount of utility or well-being. Atkinson suggested that
this measure did not involve a cardinal utility concept, but this is debatable. Taking
averages over utility implies a cardinality concept. The weakness of the approach was
that there was no empirical foundation for the specification of the underlying utility
function of income.
At about the same time (1971) the present author argued that by means of a
subjective questioning technique one could define and estimate a cardinal welfare
function of income, which later on became a key concept of the Leiden School
literature and which can be seen as a forerunner of modern happiness economics
estimation methods. By combining empirically estimated well-being with theoretical
inequality indexes, the theoretical inequality concept could be empirically filled. A
first example was how Atkinson’s index was empirically implemented in Van Praag
[23] (see also Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell [25], ch. 13)).
Apart from the cardinality issue there is a potential second problem with well-
being inequality measures in general. Income inequality measures are explicitly or
implicitly based on a transferable utility concept. Indeed, income can be redistrib-
uted. There are however more well-being determinants than income (e.g. health,
age, education, and IQ). Most of these determinants cannot be redistributed but
they are relevant for well-being, and inter-individual differences in those non-income
determinants may cause feelings of well-being inequality as well. It follows that well-
being inequality cannot be a simple generalization of income inequality, as feelings
of inequality in well-being may be caused by many factors, only one of which is
income. We do not have a simple ideal benchmark of what is minimal inequality
either. Theoretically, this has to be equality of individual well-being, but this concept
is empty, as long as we do not accept an empirical individual well-being concept.
1In line with the modern happiness economics literature we use the terms utility, welfare, well-
being and satisfaction as standing for the same empirical concept. Although from a philosophical
and semantic point of view we may differentiate between the concepts, in practice this appears
difficult.
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Nowadays the results of happiness economics have led to a beginning acceptance
of the possibility to estimate subjective well-being directly by means of evaluation
questions of the type: how do you evaluate your life as a whole on a scale from 0 to
10, where zero stands for the worst and 10 for the best situation?
We refer to Frey and Stutzer [10], Layard [16], Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell
[25, 27], Clark, Frijters, and Shields [4], Dolan et al. [5], Graham [11] for surveys of
the blooming literature.
In this paper we shall argue that the present model used in happiness literature
is essentially incomplete. The present literature2 is in essence about empirically
estimating the equation U = U(x), where x stands for a vector of characteristics of
the individual x. In relatively few contributions the impact of the reference group
of the individual is recognized. This is done by including the average income x¯ref of
the reference group and positing and estimating the extended model U = U (x, x¯ref
)
.
However, if we look at inequality this model is insufficient. Inequality summarizes
the inter-individual comparison process, where both the question of how much
importance the individual assigns to comparisons with others and the variation
between individuals within the reference group plays an important role as well.
In Section 2 we shall discuss the operational concept of subjective well-being.
In Section 3 we shall develop the corresponding well-being inequality concept. In
Section 4 we shall take account of the fact that no individual evaluates in isolation,
but that the circumstances of his reference group co-determine his norms on what
is subjective well-being. It follows that the phenomenon of social transparency or
lack of transparency plays a role in the evaluation of social subjective well-being.
This calls for developing a model of the referencing process and the definition of a
personal subjective inequality concept, which describes the inequality the individual
perceives between his satisfaction level and the satisfaction levels of others in his
reference group. In Section 5 we aggregate those feelings of personal inequality into
a social subjective inequality concept.
The aim of this paper is to sketch a theoretical model of how the reference
mechanism affects individual well-being and, consequently, the well-being inequality
concept. Finally, we consider how these insights may contribute to the shaping of
social policy. In this paper we do not give an empirical application. The reason for
this is that we do not know of the existence of a data set that would make it possible
to estimate the model. In Section 6 we discuss how these concepts might be made
operational in practice.
In Section 7 we shall briefly consider the implications for social policy, while
Section 8 concludes.
This paper may also be read as a plea for creating more empirical information
on the referencing process by extracting information from individuals in surveys and
experimental settings.
We hope that the model outlined in this paper may be a fruitful starting point
for integrating the referencing mechanism in happiness economics. This is the final
objective of this paper.
2In Section 2 we shall look more in detail on the present literature.
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2 Subjective well-being
The concept of subjective well-being is empirically based on the so-called satisfaction
questions like the one cited in the introduction. Such satisfaction questions can also
be posed with respect to life domains, such as health, financial situation and job
situation, yielding empirical evaluations of domain satisfaction or domain well-being.
The answers to such questions are mainly categorized on a numerical scale from
0 to 10, 1 to 10, or 1 to 7. There is now a growing consensus that such answers
have cardinal significance [6]. Respondents have a conception of a worst and a best
situation and they situate their situation between those points. At the moment nearly
all empirically used question modules are categorized, such that only the points 0, 1,
2,. . . , and 10 are possible answers, but it does not need much fantasy to assume that
in the near future those answers will be asked and given on a continuous scale by
the respondent who positions himself on a continuous line segment where the left
end-point stands for the evaluation of the worst conceivable situation and the right
end-point for the best conceivable situation. Let the situation itself be described by
some characteristics like ‘income’, ‘health status’ , ‘age’, in short a vector x; then
the evaluation of x is described by a number U(x). We will call such a function a
satisfaction function.3
The most simple approach is now to denote the responses on the satisfaction
question by U , which can assume values 0, 1, 2,. . . , and 10, and to postulate an
explanatory model like
Un = β0 + β1.incomen + β2.agen + β3. f amilysizen + εn (2.1)
where the variable income stands either for household income of for its logarithm.
The other variables are also defined either by absolute values or by their logarithms.
This specification or similar ones yield very interesting and stable results (see
e.g. [2]).
The problem with this specification is that the RHS can assume values outside the
range [0,10]. An easy transformation avoids this logical problem.
We may describe U(x) by a tractable distribution function on (−∞, +∞) with the
range [0,1]. This suggests the normal or the logistic as obvious choices. We assume
Un = N (β0 + β1.incomen + β2.agen + β3. f amilysizen; 0, 1) (2.2)
where N(.; 0, 1) stands for the standard normal distribution function.
Denoting the inverse by un = N−1 (Un) and adding an error term we get the OLS
model
un = β0 + β1.incomen + β2.agen + β3. f amilysizen + εn (2.3)
It has been empirically found (see e.g. [25], and also [8] for related results) that the
estimated trade-off ratios βi/β j for both specifications are nearly always not statisti-
cally different from each other. Actually, this is not that strange as both formulations
are describing the same indifference curves on the (income, age, familysize)—space.
They are just two different cardinalizations of the same preference ordering.
3We avoid the term utility, since in all empirical questions the word ‘satisfied’ is used.
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These satisfaction functions are subjective and individualized. They are subjective,
because they are derived from gauging subjective feelings. They are individualized
because individual variables determine life satisfaction.
3 Subjective inequality
Up to now there are only a few attempts to define inequality with respect to
happiness or subjective well-being4 (SWB) [9, 25]). Nevertheless, the same need
for income inequality definitions that has produced such a flourishing literature in
economics is now even more strongly felt with respect to the concept of happiness
or satisfaction inequality. If we are looking for a definition of subjective inequality it
should be based on these measured subjective satisfaction functions U(x).
Here, the basic ingredient is the observed response U and one of the corre-
sponding happiness Eqs. (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3). If all individuals in our sample would
enjoy the same SWB-level U, it would imply that SWB-inequality is minimal. This
situation may occur even if the SWB-determinants income, age and family size are
different between individuals. The only thing that counts is that their corresponding
U-values according to (2.3) are identical. The individuals have to be on the same
indifference curve. The advantage of this definition on the basis of subjective,
individually specified, satisfaction functions is that satisfaction or well-being is not
only determined by income but by many other determinants as well, such as age,
number of children, and health. For instance, there is strong evidence that the age
and health of the individual are determinants of life satisfaction. It follows then
that part of the observed inequality in well-being may be explained by differences
in age and health. If individuals have the same U (or u)-value, they enjoy the same
level of subjective well-being. Moreover, the individualization implies that different
individuals may evaluate the same objective situation (e.g. characterized by income)
differently, depending on personal characteristics such as age and health.
Now we may define inequality with respect to SWB in a similar manner as it
has been defined with respect to income. That is, any income inequality index
I(y1,..., yN) has his SWB-analogue I(u1,..., uN), The u-variable takes over the role of
(log-)income. Surely, definition of a SWB- inequality index implies accepting the
cardinal significance of U , as the measurement of inequality implies giving a meaning
to the difference between various levels of SWB. Consequently, if we do not believe
in a cardinal significance of the responses to satisfaction or happiness questions,
then it is impossible to define an SWB-inequality index, irrespective of the specific
definition of that inequality index I(u1,..., uN). This is true, notwithstanding the
fact that under an ordinal interpretation complete equality may be identified as the
situation, where all individuals assign an equal satisfaction value U to their situation.
In this paper we choose for a rather simple and intuitive definition of SWB-
inequality. We specify inequality by the variance (or standard deviation) of u over
the sample or population. As already said, we may also use any other usual income
4Notice that happiness inequality is something else as the effect of income inequality on individual
well-being. We refer to Graham and Felton [12] for an interesting study on this latter relation for
Latin–American countries.
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inequality measure like the Gini-index, the Theil-index, Pareto- or the Atkinson-
index. However, in this context, where we aim at introducing the reference group
effect within an inequality context, we take the inequality definition which is most
convenient for the exposition.
Let us assume (2.3), that is
un = β0 + β1.incomen + β2.agen + β3. f amilysizen + εn, (3.1)
or more generally




where we ignore the random error. The nice consequence of the existence of
a relationship like (3.2) is that we may trace the effects of changes in personal
characteristics xn = (x1n,..., xkn) on overall well-being.
The first approach according to which we might define subjective well-being
inequality with respect to a specific population is
σ 2 (u) = β ′ xx β (3.3)
Here the variance is taken with respect to the population density f (x) of the vector of
relevant characteristics x, and xx is the population covariance matrix of the vector x
of welfare determinants. The log-income variance is one of its diagonal elements. If
SWB is only dependent on log-income, it is obvious that SWB-inequality is just β2σ 2
(log(y)). If we assume the implicit classical assumption that SWB equals log-income,
then β = 1, and we end up with the traditional variance of log-incomes.
We see here two points to be noticed. First, the vector β makes the variance
subjective. The vector β is assessed on the basis of subjective questions on how
satisfied individuals are. Differences with respect to variables that correspond to a
relatively large β and consequently have a sizeable impact on individual well-being
will have a strong influence on overall variance, while variables with a relatively small
β will have a small effect on overall variance as well. If income is included as one of
the variables x, then income inequality is one of the components of SWB-inequality,
but inequality in other variables have influence on u or well-being U as well. Second,
we see that (3.3) depends on the population covariance matrix xx. Hence, σ 2(u)
may be seen as an aggregate of population inequalities with respect to the various
component variables xi, corrected for possible correlations between them. It is also
possible to assess the effect of changes in the x-distribution. For instance, if x1 stands
for log-income, then a change in the variance of log-income σ11 or its covariance σ12
with another variable x2 will immediately change the overall inequality index. This
index may be seen as a tool for making government policy. In the hypothetical case
that there is no objective inequality with respect to the relevant determinants x, that
is xx = O, subjective inequality will be zero as well.
If the inequality index is a political tool, then we may ask which variables x are
considered as being relevant by the government. For instance, is the number of
children relevant for making government policy? If we should not think so, we have
to ignore the SWB-differences due to the children effect, although it is intuitively
obvious that family size inequality affects life satisfaction inequality. It means that we
have to re-estimate (3.1) without including the variable family size. If that variable
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is correlated with other explanatory variables, as it most probably is, it will imply
that the estimate of the vector β will change as well. This shows that the choice of
explanatory variables is rather relevant for the definition and the measurement of
subjective inequality, and this makes the choice of which variables are considered to
be relevant for including in the inequality definition a political matter as such.
4 Personal subjective inequality as felt by individuals within reference groups
The inequality index just considered does not take into account the reference
phenomenon. Does this index account properly for the impact of the refereeing
process on the feelings of inequality of individual citizens? Probably it does not. The
reason is that the evaluation by individuals of their own situation is partly done by
comparing their own situation with that of others, the so-called reference group.
It has been found by several authors [7, 13, 15, 17, 19–22, 26] that satisfaction with
life or with one’s financial situation depends not only on own income yn but on the
average income of the reference group of n, say yn,ref , as well. For instance, (3.1)
carries over into
un = β0 + β1.incomen + β2.agen + β3. f amilysizen + γ.yn,ref + εn. (4.1)
The effect of own income is positive. The age effect is regularly found to be parabolic,
first decreasing and after about 40 increasing (see e.g. [2, 18]; in [27] even a cubic
age curve is proposed). For reasons of exposition we ignore the squared term. The
effect of children on life satisfaction is ambiguous. The effect of reference income
is mainly estimated to be negative, that is, own satisfaction reduces if neighbors get
more, although some authors like Senik [19] found a positive effect, e.g., for ex-Soviet
citizens.
Actually, the problem is how to describe the reference group. Mostly this is
intuitively defined by assumption. The reference group is equated to persons be-
longing to the same age bracket, education group, region, etc. However, this a
priori definition discards the possibility that we can learn from the data what the
composition of the reference group really is.
In order to get a more detailed description of the reference group and its influence
we need to look more in detail. We shall outline the idea by a simple example. The
group consists of various reference individuals with whom the individual in question,
called Peter, compares himself. Say, Peter’s reference group consists of John and
Adam. Now we assume that Peter is not always busy with comparing his situation
to that of others. Sometimes he is self-oriented and sometimes other-oriented. Let
us assume he is self-oriented for 60% of his time. For 30% of the remaining time he
is oriented on John and for 10% on Adam. Obviously John is the more important
reference person for him. Let us now assume that the incomes of the three persons
are ordered as yJ > yP > yA. Then it seems reasonable to assume that the individual
feels less happy if he has John in mind, than when he has Adam in mind, while his
situation is in the middle when he is self-orienting. Actually, it is only one step to
assume that yn,ref is a random variable itself and that consequently perceived well-
being un is random as well. Well-being varies with the reference person or social type
we happen to have in mind to compare with. Equation 4.1 is just the expectation of
u over the reference group.
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For convenience, let us assume that the only relevant reference characteristic is
income and that income is measured bracket-wise. The bracket averages are yref,1,...,
yref,k. The individual compares sometimes with people in the first bracket, say a
fraction p1,n of the time, sometimes with people in the second bracket, say a fraction
p2,n of the time, and so on. Those individuals may be seen as representing social types
κ = 1„,k.
Then we may write (4.1) more explicitly as
un =β0+β1.incomen+β2.agen+β3. f amilysizen+γ
[
p1,n yref,1+...+ pk,n yref,k
]+εn.
(4.2)
Here each income bracket κ is weighted by the importance it has in the reference
group of individual n. The weights, which add up to one, are denoted by p1,n,..., pk,n.
The corresponding distribution we may call the reference distribution. It may be that
every individual has the same reference group weights p1,n,..., pk,n but it is more
probable that different individuals will have different reference distributions. If all
reference distributions are the same, the weights p1,n,..., pk,n would probably reflect
the objective population fractions p1,..., pk of the different income brackets. If not,
the fractions pi,n/pi may be larger or smaller than one. If pi,n/pi > 1 it follows for n
that he overweighs the importance of people in bracket i, while pi,n/pi < 1 implies
the opposite. This ratio pi,n/pi was termed in earlier work (see [25] ch.8 and earlier
in [24]) the social f ilter, through which individual n perceives the society around him.
We may generalize this idea to a continuous reference group where the refer-
encing characteristic Yref may take any value on the real axis. Then the reference
distribution is described by a density function fref,n(y) and the average reference
income to be included in (4.2) would become Y¯ref =
∫
y. fref,n (y) dy. It is obvious
now that apart from comparing our own income with reference income we may
also compare our age to reference age, and our family size to reference family
size. If those variables are determinants for happiness, it may be surmised that
the same variables of the reference persons may have an impact on our happiness
as well. The same holds for other variables held to be relevant. In short, the
reference variable may be more-dimensional vector. Then it follows that we may
define a random reference vector Xref = (Yref , Ageref , Famsref ) with a corresponding
more-dimensional reference density function fref,n(x) and an average vector X¯ref .
Similarly we may define a variance covariance-matrix with respect to the reference
distribution, denoted by ref
Let us now generalize (4.1) in this vein. We start simply by assuming a two-person
world where an individual, say Peter, has one reference person, let us call him John,
to compare with. Peter’s situation is described by the vector XP, and John’s situation
by XJ .
Even in this very simple two-person world Peter may have a perception of
inequality of SWB, when he compares his situation with that of John. As already said,
an individual is not comparing all the time. More precisely, if an individual is never
comparing with his neighbor, he will not perceive inequality at all. If he compares
at times, then his well-being is determined by an absolute component XP and by a
relative component (XP − XJ), the difference between Peter’s and John’s situation.
We assume that people compare their situation with others only for a fraction (1 − π)
of their time while for a fraction π they look only at their own situation without
comparing. We call the fraction π the self-orientation coef f icient of the individual. Its
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complement (1 − π) may be termed the outwards-orientation coefficient. It follows
that we assume that satisfaction uP is not constant for an individual but that it
depends on his or her mood of the moment ,whether he or she is comparing or non-




β0 + βXP with chance π
γ0 + γ (XP − XJ) with chance (1 − π) . (4.3)
Life satisfaction, even during a relatively short period, is not constant but it is
random, depending on whom one is comparing to at the moment. We might call
it instantaneous satisfaction. The corresponding cardinal value on [0,1] is found by
means of (2.2).
In the first situation in (4.3) Peter looks only at his own situation, he is self-
oriented. In the second situation it is only the difference between him and John that
counts. Notice that in this simple specification even if Peter and John are in the same
situation, this does not imply that the individual ‘s uP is the same in both situations.
Just the fact that both are felt to be in the same situation as such may make Peter feel
less happy or more happy. It is evident that this specification is just an example.
We notice that the expectation E(uP), like in (4.2), is a linear function in XP
and XJ
E (uP) = π.β0 + (1 − π) γ0 + π.βXP + (1 − π) γ (XP − XJ) . (4.4)
If the true model is (4.4), where yn,ref is a random variable depending on whether we
compare or not at the moment, we are in fact estimating its expectation (4.1).
We notice that the parameter π is unknown and has to be estimated as well. We
cannot empirically identify β without further information with respect to the compar-
ison chance. Perhaps, the Day Reconstruction Method, as described by Kahneman
et al. [14], can shed light on what is the frequency of comparison moments.
Now we may also define a feeling of personal well-being inequality as felt by Peter.
It is
σ 2 (uP) = π [β0 + βXP − E (uP)]2 + (1 − π)
[
γ0 + γ (XP − XJ) − E (uP)
]2
= π (1 − π) [β0 − γ0 + βXP − γ (XP − XJ)
]2 (4.5)
We see that the feeling of inequality is zero, if the self-orientation π is either zero or
one. The feeling of inequality is the highest, if Peter is self-oriented half of the time,
that is π = 1/2. It is also evident that Peter and John may have a different perception
of the inequality between them as their π ’ s may be unequal and/or their satisfaction
functions may differ.
A generalization of this definition using other specifications of the satisfaction
index uP than in (4.3) lies at hand.
Let us now extend the concept of a reference group from a one-person group
to a multi-person group. Each social type is characterized by a vector X. Now





β0 + β1.incomen + β2.agen + β3. f amilysizen with chance π(= β0 + β ′ Xn
)




with chance 1 − π.
(4.6)
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The vector Xref,n is random and drawn from n’s reference distribution with density
function fref,n (x). We have here a random choice process in two stages. The first
choice determines whether the individual is in a comparing or a non-comparing
mood, chances being (1 − π) and π , respectively. Second, the question is which
specific reference type Xref,n is coming into n’s mind, when he is actually comparing.
This is described by the reference density function fref,n(x). Since more persons
may be described by the same vector xref,n, it is the description of a social type.
The random vector Xref,n is varying over the space of social types. Notice that the
expectation of un is
E (un) = μn = π.
[
β0 + β ′ Xn





where X¯ref,n is the vector of expectations of Xref,n with respect to the reference
density function fref,n (x). One may call the average vector X¯ref,n the social focal
point of n. Notice that it is by no means necessary that X¯ref,n = Xn, that is, that
individuals take their own type as the focal point of their reference group. More
usually they may take somebody or some social type, who is socially above them, as
a social focal point. Equation (4.7) or rather the expectation of (4.6) with respect to
Xref,n is estimated in the happiness literature. It is linear in own characteristics and in
the average characteristics X¯ref,n of the reference group. Up to now in the empirical
literature reference groups are defined in terms of income only. This implies that all
elements of the parameter vector γ are assumed to be zero, except the element γ y,
which refers to income. There is however nothing against it to characterize reference
persons by a more-dimensional vector of characteristics instead of one-dimensionally
by income only.
In accordance with the definition in (4.5) in the case of a multi-person reference
group we now define the feeling of personal subjective inequality from the viewpoint
of individual n as
σ 2 (un) = π (1 − π)
[
β0 − γ0 + β ′ Xn − γ ′
(
Xn − X¯ref,n
)]2 + (1 − π) .γ ′ ref,n γ
(4.8)
This formula is based on the well-known variance decomposition formula. There are
now two ‘subgroups’ distinguished. The first is the one-person group consisting of
the individual n himself, while the second subgroup is his or her reference group,
consisting of many different social types. Hence, there is a ‘between’-inequality
described by the first term in (4.8) and a ‘within’-inequality of the reference group
itself, given by the second term.
Personal subjective inequality appears to depend on four elements. First, it
depends on the self-orientation coefficient π ; second, it depends on the perceived
difference between the individual and his or her reference group; third, on the vector
γ, that is, on the effects γ of the reference vector elements on satisfaction. Some
components have strong influence like reference income, while others presumably
will have negligible influence; fourth, it depends on the spread within the reference
group, that is, the covariance matrix ref,n. It describes in a sense the individual’s
horizon of society as perceived by individual n. If one diagonal element, say corre-
sponding to reference income, is larger than another, say, with respect to reference
age, it means that the reference group of n is wider with respect to income than with
respect to age.
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We may interpret the off-diagonal elements, say σ ref,ij, in a similar way. If
the covariance (or the correlation) is strongly positive it implies a strong positive
correlation within the reference group between, for example, income and age. A
negative correlation may be interpreted likewise.
It is obvious that the reference covariance matrix ref,n is related to but not neces-
sarily identical with that of the objective population distribution. More specifically, if
the underlying population is perfectly homogeneous with respect to a characteristic
Xi (Xref,i is constant) and hence the corresponding population variance σ ii = 0, the
reference group mostly will be perceived as perfectly homogeneous as well with
respect to that characteristic Xi, that is, σ ref,ii = 0 as well. It follows then that the
corresponding population and reference covariances are zero as well.
We notice that all parameters seem to be estimable, when we are able to get
more specific observations on the individual reference process. We need answers
to the question of how frequently an individual compares his own situation with
that of others, yielding a π -estimate and we need to know with whom the individual
compares to get an idea of the reference density function fref,n(x). That is, we need




m=1 of order M in order
to estimate n’s reference distribution.
5 Social subjective inequality with a referencing mechanism
Policy makers are not so much interested in the inequality feelings of one person, as
specified in by (4.8) by σ 2(un), but rather in the average feeling of social inequality
in society at large, that is En[σ 2(un)], where the average is taken with respect to all
members n of the population.
Now we have to account for the fact that each person may have his or her
own reference group. For each person n we define again the vector of satisfaction
determinants (Xn, Xref,n). Its dimension is 2k. We call the first half the objective
determinants. They describe the situation of person n. The second half of the vector
stands for characteristics of reference persons of n. They are called the reference
values. We can ask the person n at a specific moment in time with whom or what
social type he is comparing himself. The answer is Xref,n. The first vector is pretty
fixed per person, but Xref,n may vary per moment. It is random. Its distribution is the
reference distribution of n.
If we consider the whole population, then (Xn, Xref,n) may be considered as a
random vector defined on the whole population with an expectation (X¯, X¯ref ) and a




xref x xref xref
)
(5.1)
Now it is tempting to assume the distribution to be normal, which may be realized
after suitable redefinition of the variables. For example, taking logs frequently helps
a good deal. Still better is to apply an integral transformation where quantiles of
the empirical distribution function are mapped on the corresponding quantiles of
the standard normal distribution function. Again, we observe that choosing for
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normality after suitable transformation of the observations does not imply that the
model cannot be generalized to non-normal distributions. However, for the sake of
exposition we assume normality. In fact, whether a normal specification is realistic,
has to be inferred from empirical observation.
Now it appears possible and appropriate to assume that different individuals have
different reference groups, and, consequently, that they have different reference dis-
tributions. We see that the individual reference distributions, introduced before, may
be interpreted as conditional distributions of Xref , given the objective determinants
X of n. A very pleasant property of normal distributions is that the conditional
distributions have different means, but the same constant covariance matrix.
The conditional averages of those individual reference distributions will vary with










As before, we call this conditional average the social focal point of n. The focal point
varies with the objective characteristics xn. Mostly we may assume a positive corre-
lation between objective individual characteristics xn and reference characteristics,
as individuals tend to compare themselves with those who belong to the same social
group. If xxref = O, the gravity point of the reference distribution is constant. In a
similar way using the well-known formulae of normal distribution theory we find that





) = xref xref − xxref −1x x xref x. (5.3)
This conditional covariance matrix is the same matrix ref,n which we used in (4.8).
It is obviously smaller (in the sense of matrix ordering) than the overall reference
covariance matrix xref xref . Under the assumption of normality this matrix is constant,
that is, ref,n = ref .
It follows from (5.2) that




= C + (I − B) Xn (5.4)
where C is a constant vector and B is the matrix of ‘regression’ coefficients of X¯ref,n
on Xn.
Now we may define overall social inequality as the expectation of (4.8) over the
population.
Using (5.4) we rewrite
β0 − γ0 + β ′ Xn − γ ′
(
Xn − X¯ref,n
) = β0 − γ0 − γ ′C +
(
β ′ − γ ′ (I − B)) Xn
= C˜ + D˜′ Xn
where β0 − γ0 − γ ′C = C˜ is a scalar and where
(
β ′ − γ ′ (I − B)) = D˜′ is a row vector.
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π (1−π) [β0−γ0+βXn−γ ′
(
Xn− X¯ref,n





π (1 − π)
[
C˜ + D˜′ Xn
]2 + (1 − π) .γ ′ ref,n γ
]
=









+ (1 − π) .γ ′ ref γ .
(5.5)
If π = 1, that is no comparison with other individuals, the inequality is zero. In the
case that the individual derives his satisfaction completely by comparison (π = 0) the
inequality will be γ ′xx γ .
It follows that subjective inequality does not only depend on the inequality with
respect to own welfare determinants, but that it also depends on the individual
reference effects and on the inequality in the reference group.
In the above we made the convenient assumption that the underlying distribution
of (Xn, Xref,n) would be multivariate normal. Although not unreasonable as a first
approximation, it is not really needed. The conceptual model just described holds for
any distribution, but only the formulae become less elegant or have to be replaced
by numerical calculations.
6 Where to find the data?
Unfortunately the model is not yet operational by lack of data. The problem is
obviously how to estimate the matrices xxref , xref xref and the comparison chance
π . This is only possible if we can observe per individual the whole vector (Xn, Xref,n)
and not only the first half of that vector. This implies repeated interviewing in order
to get an idea per individual of his/her reference distribution and to get an estimate
of the self-orientation parameter π , that is how frequently he compares with other
people. A relatively rare example of frequent interviewing is the diary method, as
applied by Kahneman et al. [14], which they call the Day Reconstruction Method.
A first inspiration content-wise is given by a recent paper by Clark and Senik [3]
who analyzed two questions put in Wave 3 of the European Social Survey (ESS). One
question is the following: “Whose income would you be most likely to compare your
own with? Please choose one of the groups on this card: Work colleagues/Family
members/Friends/Others/Don’t compare/Not applicable/Don’t know.” This ques-
tion, which was very well responded to, is in the spirit of the questions we would
have in mind.
We would suggest for comparisons to construct a Xref,n-vector some nuclear
questions like these:
Everybody compares his situation with that of others. When you compare yourself
other persons, take the person (perhaps plural? To make the respondent think about
a group of people) in mind with whom you most frequently compare. Call him
John/Betsy. Please, can you describe some features of Betsy
1. What might be Betsy’s net household income about?
2. How would you classify Betsy’s health on a scale from 0 to 10?
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3. How old is Betsy?
4. What is her family size?
5. Her age?
6. Her employment status?
7. Her education?
8. Would you classify her in the first place as work colleague/family mem-
ber/friend/others/not applicable/don’t know
9. How often do you see Betsy?
10. Do you think that Betsy is happier, equally happy, or less happy in life than
you?
11. Would you be happier, equally happy, or less happy in life when you were Betsy
than you are feeling now being yourself?
It is obvious that this is just a first suggestion on possible questions, but it is clear that
repeated interviews would give the researcher an idea about who are the reference
persons of each individual, how they look like, and concretely, about the distribution
of Xref,n. As there is frequently more than one reference person, we could try to ask
the same question for a second person, say Peter. Moreover, we could try to get an
idea of how frequently the respondent compares with Betsy and how frequently with
Peter. Obviously this can be extended to more reference persons. It is in this way that
we think that the reference group model outlined above may be operationalized.
7 What does this mean for social policy?
Let us assume a government which is interested in enhancing the well-being of its
people. It formulates a Social Welfare Function (SWF) analogous to Markowitz’
portfolio theory, as
SWF = δ.E (u) − (1 − δ) .σ 2 (u) . (7.1)
It is a δ-weighted average of average individual SWB and inequality in individual
SWB, where social inequality is negatively signed, assumed to be bad. The SWF has
to be maximized and the question is now what instruments the government can use.
Obviously, there are some objective characteristics X like e.g. income, education,
and health which may be influenced by government, although not without a cost
attached. A change in the parameters β will be rather difficult as they describe real
preferences. The same holds more or less for the parameters γ . They stand for the
jealousy effects, which seem to be fixed elements of human nature and although we
do not deny that ethical/religious indoctrination may reduce jealousy effects, we do
not think that this is a very powerful policy nowadays.
However, a final element is the matrix xref xref . It describes the transparency of
society, and there holds the larger the transparency, the greater personal inequality
feelings will be.
We may write (7.1) more explicitly as
SWF = δ. ((π (β0 + β ′μx
) + γ ′ (1 − π) (X¯ − X¯ref
)) + − (1 − δ) . (σ 2(u)) . (7.2)
The second term may be written more explicitly by substituting (5.5). From this
formula (7.2) it is clear that the parameters of the referencing mechanism play an
important role in the perception of the SWF. As we saw already, the reference
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distribution is a description of how visible other people are for a citizen. The
covariance matrix describes the social transparency of society with respect to a
number of relevant dimensions, described by the dimensions of X.
It is obvious that the referencing process is a sociological phenomenon, which
can be influenced. We think here especially of media policy. For instance, when
television disseminates on a day to day basis how the rich are living it is obvious
that the frequency of comparing and social transparency is increased enormously. In
formula it would imply that xref xref is increased while π and xxref are decreased, as
social segmentation is reduced.
The same holds on a global level for global inequality feelings. Hence, govern-
ments, and to a lesser extent publications in radio and printed journals and news-
papers, have a non-negligible and perhaps even enormous effect on the referencing
mechanism. Although it is fashionable to welcome more social transparency, it is
a matter to be discussed whether this tendency is good from a standpoint of social
well-being. The model outlined above suggests that there are risks involved.
There will be costs associated with the manipulation of π , Xref , xxref , xref xref .
These costs may be purely monetary but they may also be of a non-monetary
nature. For instance, a reduction of social transparency will be considered by some
as a loss, especially by the press. If we try to maximize the SWF we may add a























In this paper we built a model to include the social referencing mechanism into
happiness economics. We do not have the illusion that this model will be estimable
in a year from now. However, as Section 6 suggests, it is certainly conceivable to
estimate the missing parameters of the reference mechanism by posing suitable
questions.
It is well-known that comparing with reference groups affects feelings of individual
subjective well-being. In this paper we argue that referencing affects inequality
feelings as well. The subjective inequality concept was introduced in Van Praag
and Ferrer-i-Carbonell [25]. When we are investigating inequality of subjective
well-being we have to recognize that interpersonal comparisons by individuals with
their reference persons must be at the basis of the inequality concept. Therefore
we defined an individual’s reference group as a distribution of reference persons
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described in terms of the same characteristics which we deem to be relevant satisfac-
tion determinants for the individual himself.
If we assume that the individual’s well-being is partly determined by comparison
with his reference group, the same will hold for his perception of the inequality of
well being; in fact, it is the well-being inequality within his reference group plus the
inequality between the individual and his reference group as a whole.
Then we make a distinction between the individual’s SWB-inequality as perceived
by individuals and social SWB-inequality, which is an average of the individual
subjective well-being inequality perceptions.
If we assume that social well being, as described by a social welfare function,
depends on individual subjective well-being and on the individual’s perception of
SWB-inequality, it follows that the reference mechanism as such may have an effect
on the social welfare function. If a government accepts the task of increasing SWB, it
may see influencing the social reference mechanism as a legitimate policy instrument.
The present paper is a first and necessarily mainly theoretical exercise on this
line. At the moment we do not know of available data to operationalize our model
empirically. However, we outline how, as an extension of existing questionnaires, we
may add new questions by means of which it becomes empirically possible to estimate
the parameters of the referencing mechanism in practice. If such data are realized,
the way lies open for an empirical operationalization of this model.
We hope by this paper to have drawn more attention to the probably important
role of the referencing mechanism for the implementation of social policy.
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